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Abstract 
China and India have both sought control over the exchange rate in order to maintain export 
competitiveness, manage current account balance, and pursue independent monetary policy. In this paper, 
we examine structural change in the Chinese and Indian de facto exchange rate regimes, focusing on the 
period from 1998 to 2007. With increasing capital account openness, exchange rate inflexibility has been 
associated with significant monetary policy distortions. In both countries, the short-term rate expressed in 
real terms dropped, and achieved very low values, in the unprecedented business cycle expansion of the 
early 2000s. In the Indian case, difficulties of sterilisation led to a modification of the exchange rate 
regime, moving towards greater flexibility. In China, in contrast, the exchange rate regime did not change. 
JEL Classification: E52, E58 
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1.  Introduction 
China and India have both attempted distorting the exchange rate in order to 
foster exports-led growth. This is described as the ‘Bretton Woods II’ framework, where 
developing countries buy bonds in the US and keep undervalued exchange rates, in 
order to foster export-led growth. 
The costs and benefits of this approach need to factor in the extent to which 
monetary policy is distorted by the pursuit of exchange rate policy. In this paper, we 
start by identifying dates of structural change, and the characteristics of the de facto 
exchange rate regime, for both countries. These results utilise recent developments in 
the econometrics of structural change. 
We then examine business cycle conditions and the short-term rate (ex- pressed in 
real terms) in both India and China. We find that through the great business cycle boom 
of the early 2000s, both countries followed ex- pansionary monetary policy. This is 
consistent with the idea that de facto exchange rate pegging induces a loss of monetary 
policy autonomy. By fol- lowing expansionary monetary policy at a time of buoyant 
business  cycle conditions,  in both  countries,  monetary  policy contributed to 
exacerbating instability of GDP; it helped exacerbate both boom and bust. 
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Capital flows and conditions on currency markets changed profoundly from late 
2007 onwards. Hence, this paper is primarily focused on the period from 1998 till 2007, 
the period where both countries were trying to use monetary policy to obtain exchange 
rate undervaluation. These difficulties need to be brought into the assessment of the 
‘Bretton Woods II’ regime. 
2.  The exchange rate regime 
An extensive literature suggests that both China and India have de facto pegged 
exchange rates,  where policy makers desire to influence the bilateral exchange rate 
against the USD (Shah et al., 2005; Frankel, 2009; Patnaik, 2007). 
In India, according to the RBI (the Indian central bank), the rupee is a “market 
determined  exchange rate”,  in the sense that  there  is a currency market  and the 
exchange rate is not administratively determined. India has clearly moved away from 
fixed exchange rates. However, RBI actively trades on the market, with the goal of 
“containing volatility”, and influencing the market price. 
Patnaik (2007) shows that the INR is de facto pegged to the USD. As is typical with 
such an exchange rate regime, the nominal INR/USD exchange rate has had low 
volatility, while all other measures of the exchange rate have been more volatile. Over 
the 1993-2006 period, the annualised volatility of the INR/USD was 4.2%.  For a 
comparison, the annualised volatility of the USD/JPY rate was 11.6%. 
 
Figure 1 Comparing  Chinese and Indian  exchange rate  movements 
 
 
China on the other hand is more open in discussing currency pegging. The 
objective of monetary policy “is to maintain the stability of the value of the currency 
and thereby promote economic growth.”’ After being fixed to the US dollar for many 
years, China announced a shift away from a fixed rate to a basket peg in July 2005. 
However, the renminbi remained de facto pegged to the US dollar (Shah et al., 2005). 
2.1   Comparison of the level of the exchange rate 
We embark on our comparison of the two exchange rate regimes by examining 
fluctuations of the bilateral exchange rate to the US dollar. This is shown in Figure 1. In 
order to directly compare fluctuations of the INR and the CNY against the USD, the  
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Figure rescales the Chinese exchange rate to be identical to the rupee-dollar exchange 
rate at the starting point of the graph. 
In these units (i.e., rescaled to INR/USD exchange rate levels), both trajectories 
were similar, other than a substantial rupee depreciation from 2001 to 2002. The graph 
also visually conveys the greater flexibility of the bilateral rupee-dollar rate when 
compared with the yuan-dollar rate. 
A key concern of Chinese currency policy has been about the impact of the real 
exchange  rate  on  exports. In the period from 2000 to 2007, the BIS real effective 
exchange rate for China showed a depreciation of 5%, while India  showed an 
appreciation of 11.5%. Combined with the size of Chinese trade surpluses, especially 
with  the  US, the  movement of the  real exchange rate  of the yuan has created  a 
significant literature examining the issue of the undervaluation of the Chinese yuan 
(Goldstein and Lardy, 2008; Roubini, 2007; Goldstein, 2007). Indian policy makers have 
possibly favoured exchange rate depreciation owing to concerns about competitiveness 
of Indian exporters who compete with Chinese firms. 
 
Table 1 Volatility of the bilateral rate to the USD 
Year  Annualised currency 
India 
volatility 
China 
1998 5.568  0.856 
1999  1.999  0.041 
2000 2.565  0.077 
2001  2.055  0.047 
2002 1.079  0.137 
2003  2.147  0.055 
2004 5.257  0.016 
2005  3.343  2.042 
2006 3.518  0.749 
2007  4.995  1.574 
 
2.2   Comparison of volatility of the exchange rate to the US dollar 
We examine the level and the time-series variation of the volatility of the 
exchange rate to the US dollar in Table 1. This shows the volatility of the bilateral 
exchange rate (to the USD), for each year, for both China and India. 
In the Indian case, the volatility attained the highest values of roughly 5% per year 
in 1998 and 2007 with lower values seen in the intermediate years. In the Chinese case, 
the highest values seen were of 1.5% of 2%. This numerically restates the picture that is 
visible in Figure 1, of a less flexible Chinese exchange rate (expressed in US dollars). 
2.3   Extent to which appreciation against the USD was resisted 
A substantial decline in the US dollar took place from 31 January 2002 till 18 
March 2008.  The US Fed calculates the ‘major currencies index’, an index of the US 
dollar against the major international currencies, all of which are floating exchange rates. 
Over this period, this index fell from a value of 112.618 to a value of 69.263, a decline 
of 38.4%. Ordinary market forces would have generated corresponding appreciations of  
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other currencies, when expressed against the dollar. The extent to which countries 
resisted appreciation against the dollar is a key factor explaining  why some countries did 
not have significant appreciations. Table 2 compares some major currencies by their 
depreciation against the USD and also offers an international comparison for the 
annualised volatility of the bilateral exchange rate against the USD. 
 
Table 2 Depreciation of various currencies against the US dollar between 31 January 2002 and 18 March 2008 
 
While floating exchange rates had an appreciation against the dollar of 38.4%, 
India (ranked 17th in this list), had an appreciation of 17.19% and China (ranked 19th) 
had an appreciation of 14.46%. Only three currencies - from rank 22 to rank 24 - 
showed a depreciation against the US dollar in this period. Of these, two countries (Sri 
Lanka and Venezuela) were under particularly adverse political conditions. 
Ranked by rigidity of the bilateral exchange rate against the USD, the Chinese 
Yuan is at rank 2 and the Indian rupee is at rank 4 in this list. This evidence suggests 
Rank Country  or  area  currency  Depreciation 
(Percent) 
Volatility 
(Annualised)
1  New Zealand  New Zealand Dollar -48.44 11.94 
2  Eurozone  Euro  -45.43  8.74 
3 Denmark  Danish  Krone  -45.22  8.76 
4  Australia  Australian dollar  -45.21  10.29 
5 Sweden  Swedish  Krona  -43.95  10.11 
6  Norway  Norwegian Krone  -43.84  11.08 
7 Switzerland  Swiss  franc  -42.38  9.66 
8  US major currencies index   -38.40   
9 Canada  Canadian  dollar  -37.53  8.00 
10  South Africa  Rand  -31.21  16.76 
11 Great Britain Pound -29.97  8.11 
12  Thailand  Thai baht  -29.41  7.49 
13 Brazil  Real  -29.33  15.49 
14  Japan  Yen  -26.57  9.47 
15 Singapore  Singapore dollar -24.93  4.05 
16  South-Korea  Won  -23.47  6.77 
17 India  Indian  rupee  -17.20  3.83 
18  Malaysia  Ringgit  -17.01  2.48 
19 China  Yuan-Renminbi  -14.46  1.19 
20  Taiwan  Taiwan dollar  -12.23  3.85 
21  Hong Kong  Hong Kong dollar  -0.38  0.55 
22  Sri Lanka  Rupee  14.96  4.15 
23 Mexico  Mexican  peso  17.02  6.78 
24  Venezuela  Venezuelan bolivar  179.32  19.45  
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that both India and China were de facto pegs to the US dollar, with very low currency 
flexibility by international standards. 
2.4   Fine structure of the exchange rate regime 
In the last decade, the literature has revealed that the de jure exchange rate regime 
in operation in many countries that is announced by the central bank differs from the de 
facto regime in operation. This has motivated a small literature on data-driven methods 
for the classification of exchange rate regimes (see e.g., Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004; 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2003; Calvo and  Reinhart,  2002).  This  literature has 
attempted to create datasets identifying the exchange rate regime in operation for all 
countries in recent  decades,  using  a  variety  of alternative algorithms. While  these 
databases are useful for many applications, they have limited usefulness in measuring the 
fine structure of intermediate regimes.  As an  example,  the Reinhart  and Rogoff 
classification sees the Indian rupee as a single exchange rate regime from 1993 onwards. 
As the evidence ahead shows, there is a fine structure in the post-1993 period which 
yields fresh insights into the causes and consequences of the exchange rate regime and 
monetary policy framework. 
A valuable tool for understanding the de facto exchange rate regime in operation is 
a linear regression model based on cross-currency exchange rates (with respect to a 
suitable  numeraire).    Used at least since Haldane and Hall (1991), this model was 
popularized by Frankel and Wei (1994) (and is hence also called Frankel-Wei model). 
Recent applications of this estimation strategy include B´enassy-Qu´er´e et al. (2006), 
Shah et al. (2005) and Frankel and Wei (2007). In this approach,  an independent 
currency, such as the Swiss Franc  (CHF),  is chosen as an arbitrary ‘numeraire’.  If 
estimation involving the Indian rupee (INR) is desired, the model estimated is: 
 
This regression picks up the extent to which the INR/CHF rate fluctuates in 
response to fluctuations in the USD/CHF rate. If there is pegging to the USD, then 
fluctuations in the JPY and DEM will be irrelevant, and we will observe β3 = β4 = 0 
while β2 = 1. If there is no pegging, then all the three betas will be different from 0. The 
R
2 of this regression is also of interest; values near 1 would suggest reduced exchange 
rate flexibility. 
To understand the de facto exchange rate regime in a given country in a given time 
period, researchers and practitioners can easily fit this regression model to a given data 
window, or use rolling data windows. However, such a strategy lacks a formal inferential 
framework for determining changes in the regimes. This has motivated an extension of 
the econometrics of structural change for the purpose of analysing structural change in 
the Frankel-Wei model (Zeileis et al., 2008). This involves extending the familiar Perron-
Bai methodology (Bai and Perron, 2003) for identifying the dates of structural change in 
an OLS regression. Through this, dates of structural change in the exchange rate regime 
are identified. We focus on the period after 1994, and utilise weekly changes in exchange 
rates for these estimations. Values shown in brackets are t statistics.  
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Table 3 China’s de facto exchange rate regime 
Period USD  JPY EUR  GBP  σe R
2 
15 Apr ’94 - 22 Jul ’05  1.006 
(215.9) 
-0.003 
(-1.0) 
0.015 
(1.47) 
-0.008 
(-1.4) 
0.113 0.994 
22 Jul ’05 - 17 Apr ’09  0.949 
(56.8) 
0.008 
(0.6) 
0.062 
(2.3) 
0.002 
(0.1) 
0.243  0.974 
 
Table 3 shows the results of this estimation strategy for the Chinese Renminbi. It 
finds that the first period runs from 15 April 1994 till 22 July 2005. This is a simple 
USD peg, with a coefficient of 1 for the USD, zero coefficients on all other currencies, a 
residual standard deviation of 0.113 and an R
2 of 0.994. From 22 July 2005 till 17 April 
2009, a single sub-period of the exchange rate regime holds. 
In some respects, this result agrees with official statements and a simple visual 
examination of the exchange rate. The break date of 22 July 2005 that is derived from 
the econometrics is consistent with that announced by the authorities. In these respects, 
the results for China help us see that the econometric analysis is broadly on the right 
track. 
At the same time, there is something important in the fact that after 22 July 2005, 
no further structural change is announced. This contradicts a variety of official claims 
which have been made  about  the  evolution  of the exchange rate  away from dollar 
pegging towards a basket peg, and towards greater exchange rate flexibility. 
The econometrics suggests that remarkably little has changed about the actual 
exchange rate regime in operation when compared with the previous regime. The USD 
coefficient has dropped to 0.949. A statistically significant Euro coefficient has emerged, 
with a small value of 0.06 where the null hypothesis of 0 can be rejected. The residual 
standard deviation has more than doubled to 0.243. But the R
2 has dropped only slightly 
to 0.974. While there was more exchange rate flexibility in this period, the change in the 
exchange rate regime was extremely small. 
While the dating methodology of Zeileis et al. (2008) reports a structural break on 
22 July 2005, the difference that came about in the exchange rate regime is small. The 
euclidian distance between the vector of slopes before and after works out to just 0.075. 
In India, when the rupee began its life as a ‘market determined exchange rate’ in 
March 1993, for the first two years, the exchange rate regime was actually almost a fixed 
exchange rate  to the USD. The USD coefficient was 0.967 and the only other 
statistically significant coefficient was the JPY at 0.028. The residual standard deviation 
was 0.164 and the R
2 was 0.9887. This was greater exchange rate inflexibility than that 
found in China after July 2005.  
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Table 4 India’s de facto exchange rate regime 
Period  USD  JPY  EUR  GBP  σe  R
2 
19 Mar ’93 - 3 Mar ’95  0.967 0.028 0.012 0.028 0.164  0.989
  (58.3)  (2.0)  (0.4)  (1.3)    
10 Mar ’95 - 21 Aug ’98  0.943 0.067 -0.026 0.042 0.937  0.729
  (12.8) (1.4) (-0.2) (0.6)    
28 Aug ’98 - 19 Mar ’04  0.993 0.010 0.098 -0.003 0.277  0.969
  (61.7) (1.0) (2.9) (-0.2)   
26 Mar ’04 - 17 Apr ’09  0.734 0.050 0.440 0.086 0.853  0.721
  (14.5)  (1.2)  (5.0)  (2.0)     
 
In the period of the Asian crisis, there was a dramatic change in flexibility in the 
Indian exchange rate regime. The residual standard deviation rose to 0.937, and the R
2 
dropped to 0.729. However, the only significant coefficient in the regression was the 
USD with a value of 0.943 which is not much different from 1. This was, hence, a 
period of pegging to the USD, with significant flexibility. 
After this, India returned to USD pegging. From 28 August 1998 till 19 March 
2004, the USD coefficient went back to 0.993. The only other significant coefficient was 
for the Euro, with a value of 0.098. The residual standard deviation went back down to 
0.277 and the R
2 rose to 0.969. In this period, the exchange rate regime in India was 
similar to that found in China after July 2005. 
In the last period, India returned to significant exchange rate flexibility. The USD 
coefficient dropped to 0.734. Coefficients for the Euro and the Pound were statistically 
significant, and the Euro coefficient was economically significant at 0.44. The residual 
standard deviation rose to 0.853 and the R
2 dropped to 0.721. The change in the 
exchange rate regime which took place in March 2004 was both statistically significant 
and economically significant. The euclidian distance between the vector of slopes that 
prevailed before and after this date works out to 0.44, which is six times bigger than that 
associated with the Chinese exchange rate regime reform of July 2005. 
3.  Capital controls 
The Chinn-Ito measure of de jure capital controls (Chinn and Ito, 2008) shows that 
both countries have had substantial capital controls. For both China and India, the 
Chinn-Ito measure stagnated at -1.13 from 1970 till 2007. 
This was in sharp contrast with the substantial scale of de jure capital account 
decontrol which took place worldwide. Figure 2 shows the kernel density plot of the 
Chinn-Ito measure across all countries. In both years, the density is bimodal, with a 
cluster of countries with largely open capital accounts and a cluster of countries with 
largely closed capital accounts. In 1970, the value of -1.13 was close to the mode. From 
1970 to 2007, many countries migrated away from capital controls. China and India 
were not among these. 
The world mean Chinn-Ito score went from -0.4 in 1970 to +0.5 in 2007. In Asia, 
the  Chinn-Ito  score averaged  -0.32 in 1970.  It went  up to 0.43 in 2007. Emerging 
markets averaged -0.38 in 1970; this went up to 0.59 in 2007. Finally, the G-20 countries  
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experienced an evolution of the average Chinn-Ito score from 0.03 in 1970 to 1.52 in 
2007. Hence, whether China and India are compared against the world average, against 
Asia, against emerging markets or against G-20 members, the lack of de jure capital 
account liberalisation  in these countries stands out when compared with the 
developments worldwide. 
 
Figure 2 Density of the Chinn-Ito measure: comparing 1970 vs. 2007 
 
 
At first blush, a consistent monetary policy regime requires capital controls when 
exchange rate inflexibility is present, so as to ensure autonomy of domestic monetary 
policy. Hence, the exceptional use of strong de jure capital controls by China and India 
(by international standards) is consistent with the exceptional exchange rate inflexibility 
in these countries (by international standards). 
The difficulty with this lies in the distinction between de jure and de facto capital 
controls. Both countries have experimented with a controlled opening of the capital 
account. This has brought about elements of openness. Both countries have pursued 
trade integration, and have witnessed a massive expansion in the size of the current 
account relative to GDP. Accompanying this is an enlarged set of opportunities for 
evading capital  controls through misinvoicing.  The  international experience suggests 
that over time, the effectiveness of capital controls is diminished, as economic agents 
understand how to evade them. 
If capital controls were binding, then both countries would enjoy a consistent 
monetary policy regime, with a closed capital account and exchange rate rigidity not 
interfering with autonomy of monetary policy. To the extent that  there is de facto 
openness of the capital  account,  both  countries  would find that  exchange rate 
distortions would yield monetary policy distortions.  
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4.  The implementation of the exchange rate regime 
In both countries, currency pegging has been achieved through intervention in the 
foreign exchange market leading to a large buildup of reserves in both countries. To 
avoid the inflationary impact of this intervention, the central banks of both India and 
China have attempted to sterilise this intervention (Lafrance, 2008; Aizenman and Glick, 
2008). However, in recent years, as is acknowledged by the central bank in China, the 
People’s Bank of China (PBoC)  and documented  by a number  of studies,  it was 
becoming increasingly difficult to sterilise its intervention in China (McKinnon and 
Schnabl, 2008; Prasad, 2008; Kwan, 2006; Hannoun, 2007). 
The People’s Bank of China focussed on addressing  these difficulties im- 
plemented  a mix of measures such as open market  operations,  increase in reserve 
requirements and targetted issue of central bank bills there were meant to sterilise the 
liquidity supplied as a result of foreign exchange purchases. 
 
 
Figure 3 Rising foreign exchange reserves 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 shows China’s sharply rising reserves. As capital inflows and current 
account surpluses grew, currency pegging required larger intervention and hence an 
increasing pace of reserve accumulation. The pace of reserves accumulation steadily 
escalated. Reserves grew by 0.59% per month between Mar 1997 and May 2001; then 
they grew by 1.37% per month between Jun 2001 and Oct 2002; then they grew by 
more than 2.5% per month from Nov 2002 until the global financial crisis. 
The size of foreign exchange reserves in China and India must be looked at in the 
context of the size of the economy. Chinese GDP is much bigger than Indian GDP. In 
both countries, sterilisation involves selling government bonds which are largely bought 
by banks. In China, bank deposits are 150% of GDP while in India, they are only 50% 
of GDP. Hence, the scale of sterilisation in China can be bigger than that seen in India. 
Prasad (2007) points out that in China household and corporate savings rates are 
very high.  Financial system repression has meant that  there are few alternatives to 
funnelling these savings into deposits in the state-owned banking system. With the high 
growth rate of GDP growth and investment and fears of overheating, banks are under  
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pressure to reduce credit growth. This has made banks flush with liquidity. Banks hold 
excess reserves with the PBC even though bank reserve requirements have been raised 
and returns on excess reserves reduced sharply. Capital adequacy norms of the PBC also 
increase the incentive of banks to hold goverment/PBC bills as they carry zero capital 
requirement, while corporate bonds carry a capital requirement of hundred percent. 
There are thus many reasons for banks to want to hold government bills at relatively 
low rates. 
 
 
Figure 4 Reserves to GDP ratio 
 
 
In 2003, China ran out of government bonds for the purpose of sterilisation.
3 
Their response was to initiate bills sold by the PBOC, called ‘PBOC Bills’, from April 
2003 onwards. 
This differs from the Indian setting, where the RBI Act does not permit RBI to 
issue bonds. Hence, when the Indian equivalent of PBOC bills was put into place in 
2004, this involved sale of ‘MSS bonds’ by RBI as an agent of MOF. The fiscal cost of 
MSS bonds is clearly placed upon the exchequer in India, while in China, it only shows 
up as reduced dividend payments by the central bank. 
In India, the extent of sterilisation changed profoundly once MSS came into play. 
This partly reflects the fact that once the costs of the pegged exchange rate became part 
of the budgeting process, they were subject to greater political scrutiny of the budget 
process. In contrast, in China, there has been no restraint impeding a massive scale of 
issuance of PBOC bills. In India, there is a link between the event of running out of 
bonds for sterilisation (December 2003) and the structural break in the exchange rate 
regime (March 2004). 
Initially, PBOC bills were of three month maturity. However, the issuance shifted 
to one-year maturity. This involves somewhat higher costs reflecting the fact that one-
year bonds have a higher rate than three-month bonds. The massive pace of issuance 
led to higher rates on PBOC bills. In August 2006, this rate stood at 2.796, a rise of 0.9 
percentage points over the year. 
As the Chinese reserves accumulation proceeded, despite the low interest rates the 
issuance of PBOC bills led to high fiscal costs and the difficulty that high interest rates 
                                                 
3 Source: China in Transition by Chi Hung Kwan, August 2006.  
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would suck in further capital flows. From May 2006 onwards, PBOC bills have been 
issued under a ‘targeted issue’ scheme, where specific commercial banks are forced to 
buy specific quantities of PBOC bills at an interest rate below the market interest rate. 
For instance, on June 14, the PBC made a targeted issue of one-year maturity bills worth 
100 billion yuan at a yield of 2.1138 per cent, 0.4 per cent lower than the then prevailing 
market rate. Of the PBC bills issued, 42 billion yuan were forced on China Construction 
Bank, 30 billion yuan on Agricultural Bank of China, 12 billion yuan on Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China, 10 billion yuan on Bank of Communications,  and the 
remaining 6 billion yuan on others. 
To deal with rising difficulties PBOC raised reserve requirements  by a cu- 
mulative 3 percentage points on five occasions in 2008, freezing 70 percent of the 
increased liquidity as a result of foreign exchange purchases PBOC (2009). 
In terms of the evolution of the Indian  exchange rate  regime, the period of 
successful sterilised intervention aligns well with the sub-period of the exchange rate 
regime drawn from Table 4, from 28 August 1998 to 19 March 2004, where there was a 
tight peg to the US dollar with an R
2 of 0.969. 
In late 2003, RBI ran out of bonds for sterilisation.  A short while later, the 
exchange rate regime changed from 26 March 2004 onwards to have greater exchange 
rate flexibility. In contrast, in China’s case, no comparable modification of the exchange 
rate regime took place. 
5.  The implications of the exchange rate regime for monetary policy 
When the capital  account is perfectly open, exchange rate  policy inevitably 
involves distorted interest rates. In the case of China and India, while capital controls 
are very restrictive at a de jure level, there is significant openness at a de facto level. As a 
consequence, attempts at exchange rate pegging have come at the cost of monetary 
policy autonomy. 
Capital flows generally tend to be procyclical. As a consequence, when business 
cycle conditions are good, capital tends to come into the country. If the central bank 
tries to prevent appreciation by purchasing dollars, this leads to low short term interest 
rate. Conversely, if exchange rate depreciation is prevented by the central bank when 
times are difficult, this requires an ‘interest rate defence’, i.e. high interest rates when 
times are bad. 
In the Indian case, the experience is summarised by comparing Figure 5 which 
uses quarterly GDP growth to show business cycle conditions, and Figure 6 which 
shows a measure of the policy rate expressed in real terms.
4 
The period over which India had highly restricted exchange rate flexibility ran 
from August  1998 to  March  2004.  Late  in this  period,  business cycle conditions 
improved dramatically, with quarterly GDP growth going from 2% on a year-on-year 
basis to over 10%. In this period, capital came into the country. Exchange rate pegging 
meant that dollars had to be purchased. With incomplete sterilisation, interest rates in 
the domestic economy dropped sharply. The real rate fell from +3% to -4%: a 700 bps 
monetary policy easing at a time of an unprecedented business cycle expansion. The 
change in the exchange rate  regime in 2004 helped to improve monetary  policy 
autonomy, and the real rate went up to 0. This was still a very low level of the real rate 
                                                 
4 The methodology  for Figure  6 is based on Bhattacharya et al. (2008).  
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considering that  India was experiencing unprecedentedly benign business cycle 
conditions. 
Turning to China, Figure 7 shows a measure of Chinese business cycle conditions: 
the quarterly GDP growth. This shows an enormous boom in GDP growth from 2002 
onwards till 2007. Juxtaposing this against Figure 8, which shows the 90-day treasury bill 
rate (expressed in real terms), we see that from 2002 till early 2008, the real rate dropped 
by an enormous 800 basis points. This suggests that in good times, monetary policy was 
expansionary. This is consistent with the idea that exchange rate pegging converts the 
pro-cyclicality of capital flows into pro-cyclicality of monetary policy. 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Indian  quarterly  GDP growth 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Indian real rate 
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Figure 7 Chinese business cycle conditions (quarterly GDP growth) 
 
 
The use of loose monetary policy at a time of an unprecedented business cycle 
expansion, in both countries, helped induce an acceleration of inflation and an asset 
price boom. 
Figure 9 shows the time-series of the Indian CPI inflation. Through the decade of 
the 1990s, there was a prolonged effort in India to bring down inflation. By the end of 
the 1990s, CPI inflation had dropped to near-zero levels. The persistent use of low 
policy rates helped induce inflationary pressures. From 2000 onwards, CPI inflation 
came back, going all the way to levels like 10%. 
Figure 10 shows the similar time-series of Chinese inflation.    Starting from zero 
or somewhat deflationary conditions at the outset, the consistently expansionary stance 
of monetary  policy from 2002 onwards  helped  fuel a considerable acceleration  of 
inflation, which went to 8% by end-2007. 
Loose monetary policy helped to set off dramatic asset price booms. This was 
more pronounced in China than in India, as seen in Figure 11, which juxtaposes stock 
market indexes of both countries. 
 
 
Figure 8 Chinese real rate 
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Figure 9 Indian CPI inflation (year on year) 
 
 
Figure 10 Chinese CPI inflation (year on year) 
 
 
Figure 11 Asset price booms 
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6.  Developments after August 2007 
The global financial crisis erupted, starting with the run on Northern Rock in the 
UK. From August  2007 onwards, patterns of international capital  flows were 
considerably disrupted. Dramatic changes in prices of tradeables also led to considerable 
changes on the current account. China and India both experienced a sea change in 
conditions on capital flows and the exchange rate. 
Hence, the analysis of this paper is restricted to the period from 1998 till 2007, 
which is the ‘Bretton Woods II’ period where both countries attempted to have a 
varying  extent of exchange rate  rigidity  with  deepening de facto convertibility. 
 These results are not directly relevant for China or India of 2009. However, they 
illuminate  our  understanding of the  comparative economics of the exchange rate 
regime, capital controls and monetary policy of emerging markets. 
7.  Conclusion 
China and, to a lesser extent India, epitomise the ‘Bretton Woods II’ strategy of 
governments trying to undervalue the exchange rate so as to have export-led growth. 
The Chinese exchange rate regime has largely consisted of a tight peg to the US dollar. 
While there was a statistically significant change in the exchange rate regime in July 
2005, this was not an economically significant change. 
In India’s case, Chinese-style pegging to the US dollar has been undertaken twice: 
from March 1993 to March 1995, and from August 1998 to March 2004. In  other 
times, while there has been greater exchange rate flexibility, this has still been a period 
of substantial trading on the currency market by the central bank. While India appears 
to have greater flexibility than China, it still has a fairly inflexible exchange rate by 
international standards. 
Both countries implemented  dollar pegs through  sterilised intervention in an 
environment of substantial restrictions against capital flows. 
The key argument of this paper is that  this policy framework has induced 
substantial difficulties, and imposed significant costs upon both economies. 
The first issue is that of durability. In India’s case, each episode of tight dollar 
pegging only lasted a short period, and gave way to greater exchange rate flexibility 
when the monetary  policy distortions  built  up.  Chinese-style pegging worked for a 
longer time period, from August 1998 to March 2004, owing to the ease with which 
sterilisation was achieved. When the bonds used for sterilisation ran out, this phase of 
pegging ended. These changes in the exchange rate regime and the stance of monetary 
policy have been shocks to the economy, as opposed to the stability of the monetary 
policy regime which would have  been attainable in a consistent monetary  policy 
framework. 
The second issue is the mismatch between monetary policy and business cycle 
conditions. In both countries, exchange rate policy led to real inter- est rates being low 
at a time of expansionary business cycle conditions. In both countries, this kicked off 
increases in inflation and asset price booms. The exchange rate regime converted the 
procyclicality of capital flows into procyclicality of monetary policy. 
A fuller assessment of the ‘Bretton Woods 2’ regime requires pulling to- gether its 
overall costs and benefits.  An examination  of the extent to which exchange rate  
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distortions fueled exports growth and GDP growth is beyond the scope of this paper, 
which has focused on understanding the consequences of the exchange rate regime for 
monetary policy. 
The two countries have another feature in common: in neither country did these 
monetary policy distortions trigger off reforms of the monetary policy framework. We 
may hence say that while the monetary policy regime was imposing significant costs for 
the economy, the political leadership preferred to  live with  the  prevailing  monetary 
policy regime rather than undertake reform. 
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